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 “Content is a glimpse of something, an encounter like a flash.  It is very tiny – 
very tiny, content.”  Attributed to Willem de Kooning. 
ABSTRACT 
With Full Delegation Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS), separation 
control would be delegated to the (properly equipped) aircraft, i.e. aircraft pilots 
are responsible for aircraft separation.  The aim is to try to identify a tangible 
work programme – rational and evidence based, and within the compass of 
known techniques – that would prove safety.  The task here is to create a 
framework in which to integrate these existing building blocks with results from 
additional work developed from well-specified experiments.   
 
Reasons for retaining the existing separation minima in an ASAS system are put 
forward.  For the current system, comparatively large proportions of the Air 
Traffic Services risk budget should be allocated to ‘Reasonable Intent’ risk 
(effectively ‘right place on wrong flight path’).  The key argument here is that mid-
air collision in an ASAS environment will predominantly arise from this type of 
risk.  The use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment, which requires the probabilities 
of safety-critical events to be estimated for ‘human components’ (Human 
Reliability Analysis), is reviewed.  The danger is the creation of ‘over-elaborate’ 
models – ones whose parameters cannot be reliably estimated from the data 
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likely to be obtainable.  A simple model that can be soundly based on available 
data is proposed.   
1. INTRODUCTION 
The present air traffic control (ATC) system has several distinct components.  Air 
traffic controllers communicate through radiotelephony; they use flight plans 
agreed with pilots; they monitor highly processed radar data; and, in developed 
States, they have short-term conflict alert (STCA) systems available to warn of 
aircraft coming into close proximity.  These data flows are embedded in ‘safety 
structures’, e.g. with well-defined controlled airspace and formal rules for control 
such as the minimum separation permitted between aircraft.  System procedures 
were originally designed to be ‘tolerant’ of equipment failure, as decades ago the 
equipment was much less accurate or reliable.  The system safety structures 
have also been designed to be relatively easy for human operators to 
comprehend and use.   
 
The present concept has evolved: it is ‘overlaid’, in that new technology has 
largely been added on to the previous concept.  Any new functionality generally 
has to able to carry out both the tasks of the previous generation plus some new 
ones.  Can the current system continue ‘evolving’ for many more years?  To 
quote Amalberti (2001): 
“Most of today’s man-machine systems were designed in the 1960s…No 
system will last forever, and we are probably dealing today with ageing 
logic which will someday be replaced by a different logic once the 
technology is finally mature…” 
[The phrase ‘once the technology is finally mature’ is a key one, and is the 
subject of much of the following.]  There are already major problems with system 
capacity, leading to significant flight delays, mainly because controller workload 
is nearing acceptable limits in busy airspace sectors.  The phrase ‘Free Flight’ 
has resonated in the ATC community for much of the last decade, suggesting 
that flights should use preferred – more cost effective – routeings and profiles, 
rather than follow fixed routeings.   
 
Airborne Separation Assurance Systems – ASAS – are a possible way forward 
for air traffic management.  Studies are in progress under the auspices of the 
FAA, Eurocontrol (FAA/Eurocontrol, 2001) and the European Commission.  
Some technical details of potential technologies to provide ASAS, and the wider 
system context, are given in EC (1998) – ASAS would generally be provided 
through some kind of ADS-B (‘Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast’) 
equipment.  The main feature of ASAS is that separation control is delegated to 
the (properly equipped) aircraft, i.e. aircraft pilots are responsible for their 
aircraft’s separation from other flights.  This is termed ‘full delegation’, defined as: 
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Full delegation: Pilots are responsible for all the tasks related to 
separation assurance: identification of problems and solutions, 
implementation and monitoring. 
ASAS as used here always refers to Full Delegation.  There are other ways in 
which airborne equipment providing information on nearby aircraft can be 
integrated into the system, e.g. see Brooker (2003).  There might be critical – and 
potentially very difficult – transition processes between the present system and 
ASAS.  Such transitions might raise new problems both over time – e.g. mixed 
equipage and partial delegation of ATC tasks – and in space – e.g. interfaces 
between ASAS and conventional ATC regions.  However, intermediate 
operational steps to the ‘full ASAS’ investigated here could provide useful 
evidence on ASAS safety performance.  No assumption about the availability of 
such information is made here, i.e. it would be a ‘bonus’.  Some of the ideas and 
techniques explored here could also have wider applicability; for example, the 
development of automated aids for ground control would produce similar issues 
to those raised by ASAS.   
 
ASAS would be considerably different from the present Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) system (taken here to include ATC and all other functions that deliver air 
traffic’s safety, capacity, cost-effectiveness, etc).  This paper addresses the 
question: “How would one prove that an ASAS system is safe in practice?”  The 
biggest problem with safety arguments is the need to understand all the possible 
ways that a failure could lead to an accident.  Demonstrating completeness is 
extremely difficult with complex systems such as ASAS in busy airspace – or 
anything else that relies heavily on software, displays and people.  There is 
inevitably some resort to probabilistic arguments and statistical evidence.  So, 
the question addressed here might better be put in the form: “What would be the 
least complex and most robust calculations required to do the job?”  It needs to 
be stressed that broad-based real-time simulations are inadequate to 
demonstrate safety of complex systems, but, as will be indicated in later sections, 
well-focused simulations are indispensable components of effective risk 
analyses. 
 
ASAS has, of course, to be seen in the larger context of possible future ATM 
systems – as is evident from the linkages from the European Commission’s 
THEATRE work.  [THEATRE is the ‘Thematic Network on Air Transport for ATM 
Validation Activities’: its objective is to achieve transparency and effectiveness 
between validation projects in the 5th Framework Programme of the European 
Commission; its Validation and Safety Working Group is particularly relevant 
here.]   
The validation problem can be stated in even more demanding terms.  To quote 
the recent FAA/Eurocontrol document on ASAS (2001): 
“ASAS applications involving major reliance on aircraft systems and 
changes to present responsibilities and procedures to ensure aircraft 
separation will require rigorous safety analysis and validation before 
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implementation.  This analysis will need to demonstrate conclusively that 
the ASAS application meets or exceeds the required Target Level of 
Safety, including consideration of equipment failure and human error.  
Methodologies and guidelines for these analyses will need to be agreed at 
the international level.” 
Words such as ‘rigorous’ and ‘conclusively’ set a very uncompromising tone.  
The same kinds of phrases appear in many other ASAS-related documents – 
‘detailed and rigorous safety assessment’ is a common variant.  But the 
validation processes then described often appear to be very abstract and 
unspecific: indeed, some appear to value metaphysics and elegance as having 
more merit than practical applicability.  So, what would actually be practical and 
theoretically sound methods for achieving the quantitative goal?  Precisely what 
calculations have to be carried out?  What evidence and information from the 
operation of present systems needs to be used?  What new data has to be 
gathered – and does this require specific types of simulations?  How, in 
Amalberti’s phrase, is the technology – or rather the technology & human system 
– demonstrated to be ‘fully mature’?   
 
This paper attempts to start to answer such questions.  The aim is to try to 
identify a tangible work programme – rational and evidence based, and within the 
compass of known techniques – that would prove safety in the terms set out in 
the above quotation.  In fact, many of the building blocks already exist: the task 
here is to create a framework in which to integrate these components with 
additional work that can be developed from well-specified experiments. 
 
The sections are as follows: 
2. The Concepts of Validation and Proof 
3. Safety Targets and Probability 
4. Separation Minima 
5. Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
6. ‘Reasonable Intent’ Risks 
7. ASAS Safety Issues 
8. A ‘Minimal Framework’ Collision Risk Model 
9. Conclusions 
2. THE CONCEPTS OF VALIDATION AND PROOF 
It is necessary to try to understand the logical underpinnings of ‘validation’.  ATM 
has a definition (Eurocontrol, 1998): 
Validation – ‘The process through which a desired level of confidence in 
the ability of a deliverable to operate in a real-life environment may be 
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demonstrated against a pre-defined level of functionality, operability and 
performance.’ 
This is a complex definition.  It has moved on from the sort of definition that is 
given in dictionaries (Chambers, 1998) eg: 
validate -…to check items to ensure that they conform to input rules and 
e.g. fall within an acceptable range 
Validation in ATM appears to be being used to mean ‘proof’; again from 
Chambers: 
proof -…demonstration; evidence that convinces the mind and goes 
toward determining the decision…;  
The key phrase above that supports this view is ‘desired level of confidence’, 
which equates to ‘evidence that convinces the mind’.  One reason that the word 
proof is not used may be that the same or similar word is found in several 
European languages, where it tends to have a meaning of ‘test’.  To understand 
how proof should be manifested in ATM, it is worth examining the concept in 
logic and legal contexts, as these influence thinking about the concept. 
 
Proof in logic tends to have a very restricted meaning.  It is a demonstration of 
the validity of a proposition based on specific premises – a deductive argument.  
Thus, for any real number p, 1 + p2 ≥ 2p can be shown to be correct given the 
rules of algebra and the fact that the square of a real number is positive.  
Engineering design problems such as ASAS do not fall into this class, because 
they rely on an ‘inductive’ chain of reasoning, in which the truth of the premises 
makes it probable – rather than necessary – that the conclusion is true.  Hence, 
‘proof’ of ASAS safety cannot be logically guaranteed – an obvious point, but one 
at odds with calls for ‘absolute safety’.  In other words, it is impossible to assure 
any sort of formal ‘completeness’ of any risk analysis – there can never be a 
proof that all types of errors or risk modes have been identified.  However, in 
traditional ‘hard’ engineering disciplines, with physical constructions, 
extrapolations based on measured data combined with physical laws can enable 
the performance of a system to be proved satisfactory to a high degree of 
confidence. 
 
When human beings enter into the analysis, either as part of the operational 
system or as analysts of its performance, the situation is much more complex.  
Issues raised by the former are dealt with in latter sections.  An example of the 
latter is expert witnesses giving scientific – generally medical – evidence in a 
legal case.  They have two tasks: to provide basic scientific or technical data; and 
to present conclusions or inferences from the facts, given that the judge and/or 
jury, not having specialised knowledge, could not themselves draw.  In principle, 
such medical opinions can be empirically supported, although the required range 
of observations and experiments may not be available.   
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In an adversarial legal system, such as the UK and USA, evidence from expert 
witnesses can be challenged, and indeed both sides in a legal case can present 
expert testimony.  The sort of question with which the expert witness has to 
assist is “Has the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused 
killed the victim?”  These are obviously similar to the phrases ‘desired level of 
confidence’, and ‘evidence that convinces the mind’.  Decision-makers cannot be 
expected to accept the expert’s judgements and opinions in an uncritical fashion.  
There is an onus on him or her to be able to demonstrate to these intelligent non-
experts the reasoning and processes by which the conclusions have been 
reached.  This demonstration should be ‘robust’, i.e. with the inferences not 
easily being demolished if particular assumptions do not fully hold or 
relationships between variables are not exact.  The decision-makers – States, 
ATC organisations, and individuals – are personified here as the ‘Rational 
Evidence Scrutiniser’ (RES).  The RES represents the ‘directing minds’ 
responsible for aviation safety.   
 
Given the definition of validation set out earlier, the task of proof would need to 
be a convincing description explaining how safety is assured through protective 
barriers in the system and the nature of resilience against ‘unsafe incidents’.  
This narrative would have to make clear the nature and rationality of the 
quantifications involved.  Confidence is built by displaying with clarity the rational 
nature of the calculations and demonstrating that all the quantitative aspects 
have some reasonable basis in observations and relevant measurements.  This 
‘hard’ viewpoint stretches back to Descartes and Hume.  What else could be 
adopted in critical matters of aviation safety, because such processes must 
reflect the highest standards of public decision-making?  
 
The RES therefore wants to be convinced through a rigorous and explicit 
approach that risk estimates are well founded.  It is the actual ‘process of 
explication’ that should convince the RES that there are firm foundations to risk 
estimates.  One would expect the RES to be sceptical if the core arguments were 
to be attempted through scientific complexity, with ‘magic black box’ 
mathematical and statistical calculations involving many acronyms and a host of 
Greek symbols.  ‘Confidence’ could surely only come about through the creation 
of a compelling ‘narrative’ explanation, soundly based in theoretical 
understanding and empirical evidence, and open to challenge, checking and 
verification at every stage.  In particular, this implies that commercial modelling 
products, i.e. which are not open to the possibility of scrutiny or peer review, 
would not be adequate to convince the RES.   
 
It needs to be noted that validation is not the only critical element in ATM safety 
processes.  Certification and Verification are key elements: 
Certification – ‘The process aiming at the satisfaction of an authority that 
a deliverable complies with a set of regulations, in order to ensure its 
proper operation.’ 
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Verification – `The process of evaluating the products of a given system 
development activity to determine correctness and consistency with 
respect to the products and standards provided as input to that activity.’ 
These will not be discussed directly in the following, although many similar issues 
are involved – in particular, safety certification increasingly relies on the outputs 
from validation and safety management.   
 
More generally, safety criticality of ASAS applications is being explored by a 
number of researchers, mainly with aim of guiding developers and designers to 
ensure robustness where it is most needed.  The papers by Zeitlin (2001) and 
Zeitlin and Bonnemaison (2000), and their references to RTCA work, are 
particularly relevant to some of the issues discussed here. 
3. SAFETY TARGETS AND PROBABILITY 
The key quantitative safety concept in ATC is that of a Target Level of Safety – 
TLS.  This is actually a design hurdle.  It is a quantified risk level (measured as 
an accident rate) that a system should – i.e. be designed to – deliver.  TLSs 
cover all aviation-related causes, but do not usually attempt to cover the 
consequences of terrorism or criminal behaviour (although the literature has not 
always been clear on this).  It is usually expressed as a proportion of fatal 
accidents per so many flying hours (or airport movements when that is more 
appropriate).  As will be examined later, most of the practical problems are not 
actually with the TLS but with the proper estimation of the safety level that is – or 
would be – achieved.  There is an Actual Level of Safety – an ‘ALS’ - being 
achieved in the system under examination: how is this to be calculated with 
sufficient accuracy for the RES to be confident that the ALS < TLS? 
 
A TLS can be derived in several ways.  Brooker (2002) and the Safety 
Regulation Commission of Eurocontrol (SRCb, 2000) sketch the kinds of 
calculations involved.  TLSs appropriate for accidents arising from mid-air 
collisions have been developed since the 1970s.  They are usually derived by 
taking historical accident rates, which show a progressive reduction over time, 
and extrapolating forward.  Thus, the TLS value gets tighter and tighter over time.  
The original focus was on commercial passenger jet flights in North Atlantic 
airspace, but the TLS has been used for en route controlled airspace generally.  
In particular, it is used in the calculation of the separation minima required 
between aircraft in oceanic and domestic airspace. 
 
The TLS is measured in fatal aircraft accidents, i.e. accidents in which at least 
one person in the aircraft was killed, per so many aircraft flying hours.  The 
current ICAO (RGCSP, 1995) figure of 1.5 x 10-8 fatal aircraft accidents per flying 
hour is the total rate corresponding to mid-air collisions – for any reason and in 
any spatial dimension – in en route flight in controlled airspace.  Brooker and 
Ingham (1977), and Davies and Sharpe (1993) show how the TLS is derived.  It 
is important to stress that the TLS includes the consequences of ‘blunder’ type 
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errors, such as errors in coordination between the aircraft crew and ATC (leading 
to an aircraft occupying a flight level or routeing other than that intended by 
ATC), or errors in ATC instructions leading to a similar consequence.  For 
example, Harrison and Moek (1992) explain how the vertical domain TLS, taken 
as third of the total TLS, is partitioned into ‘loss of planned separation’ errors and 
‘other’ errors.  Thus, the TLS is not simply driven by technical operation – e.g. 
altimetry in the vertical case – but by total system performance.  This is a crucial 
point, which underpins the discussion in Section 6, on ‘Reasonable Intent’ risks. 
 
To put the ICAO TLS in context, for UK ATC, assume 1 million (106) en route 
flight hours a year indefinitely into the future.  If the TLS represents the actual risk 
rate, this would correspond to one mid-air collision – two fatal aircraft accidents – 
per 134 years.  Given current average passengers per aircraft, there would be 
about 200 fatalities in such a collision.  On past decision-making trends, such a 
TLS for 20 and 30 years ahead with an ASAS-based ATC will be even tougher.  
Such a target will requires the acceptance of the aviation community, given that 
ASAS as described here would in many ways be an ‘end state’ concept for ATC.   
 
But what does such a design target mean in practice?  To explore this, it is 
necessary to examine the statistics of rare events. 
Poisson Distributions and Confidence Intervals 
The Poisson distribution – found in any standard textbook on probability – is a 
good statistical model for discrete and rare events, particularly when such events 
are generated from a large number of independent sources.  A typical Poisson 
random variable is a count of the number of events that occur in a certain time 
interval or spatial area, e.g. the number of calls received by a switchboard during 
a given time period. 
 
For the Poisson distribution to be applicable, several conditions must apply: 
The events of interest occur at random over a particular continuous period 
of time (or distance interval, region of area, etc).   
Events occur singly, i.e. not exactly simultaneously. 
Events are statistically independent, i.e. the occurrence or non-occurrence 
of an event does not affect the chance of another event occurring.  Hence, 
the occurrence of events is ‘memoryless’.   
Events occur at a constant average rate, usually denoted by the Greek 
letter λ.   
With these conditions, it can be shown that: 
Probability (r events in time t) = (λt)r e-λt/ r!   r = 0, 1, 2... 
The Poisson distribution has expected value λt and an identical variance λt. 
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The statistical confidence intervals – again, found in standard textbooks – for a 
Poisson distribution are of key importance in assessing data on rare events.  A 
key calculation is the one-sided upper confidence point at 95% – the value "a" of 
λt for which the observation of 0 events is 5% probable, ie: 
Probability (0 events in time t) = a0 e-a / 0! = e-a = 0.05, 
which gives a = 2.995… – say 3. 
So, if during a period, zero events are observed, then with 95% confidence it can 
be said that the mean value for observation is less than 3.  This is a powerful 
message: the absence of events provides ‘weak’ evidence about the underlying 
rate. 
 
In the present context, suppose one wanted to confirm that the value of λ 
according to the TLS, 1.5 x 10-8, was being achieved in practice by counting the 
rate at which accidents occur.  Note that these are collisions (and flying hours) in 
all the en route airspace under consideration (see Davies and Sharpe (1993) for 
definitions), and that in this simple model it is assumed that about the same 
degree of protection against collision risk is to be assured everywhere in this 
airspace.  Observing for 1.33 x 108 flying hours (a large number – 1.33 times 100 
million) would statistically be expected to produce two accidents, i.e. one mid-air 
collision – noting that it is collisions which are Poisson events, not accidents.  
However, an absence of collisions would be the most statistically likely scenario, 
which would imply an upper confidence level of 3 mid-air collisions in 1.33 x 108 
hours, i.e. a collision rate of 2.25 x 10-8.  Thus, even observing for long periods 
comparable with the expected interval between accidents does not produce 
strong confidence in the value of the ALS.  Observations for much shorter 
periods are far worse: no mid-airs in a period of the order of million hours 
produces an upper confidence level two orders of magnitude above the TLS.   
 
Rare events pose an intrinsically difficult problem for the system designer.  Even 
if one or two accidents were to be observed, this does not produce large 
improvements in the degree by which he or she  could be statistically confident 
about the TLS being achieved.  The upper confidence levels for 1 and two 
observed events are shown below. 
 
Number of 
observed events 
Upper Confidence 
limit at 95% 
0 3.00 
1 4.74 
2 6.30 
 
These results, obvious to a statistician, show the impossibility of statistical proof 
through direct observations on a new system, under controlled experimental 
conditions, that ASAS meets the TLS.  The use of methods other than classical 
statistical inference does not help.  Subjective probability techniques (Hacking, 
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1976) depend on an individual’s understanding of relative outcomes, and are 
hence inappropriate for rare events.  Bayesian probability techniques require 
some kind of prior probability distribution to be constructed (the conjugate prior 
distribution for a Poisson is a Gamma distribution) – but where does the prior 
knowledge (sic) of rare events come from? 
 
There is even no way of proving the safety of the existing ATM system 
statistically (indeed, the 2002 mid-air collision over the Swiss-German border 
could be said to indicate that the TLS is not currently being met in European 
airspace).  There are obvious problems for ‘verification’, defined earlier.   
 
To solve this problem, system safety somehow has to be partitioned into 
elements, for each of which safety factors can be quantitatively demonstrated, 
with the necessary statistical confidence, for the RES.  Ideally, each element in 
this partition model would provide safety factors of 102 or 103, so that their 
product would deliver the required TLS.  Thus, the risk has somehow to be built 
up of separable components, i.e. be the product of statistically independent 
events or characteristics.  Two modelling methods can be envisaged: either the 
model is built up from features of the present system plus reliably modelled 
behaviour for new features or the model is constructed from the characteristics of 
the future system using some kinds of general principles.  These may be termed 
Collision Risk Modelling (CRM) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), 
although there are wide variations in the research literature.  To these must be 
added real-time simulation of different components of new ATM systems.  
[FAA/Eurocontrol, 1998 is an excellent review article on these and other aspects 
of collision risk estimation.] 
 
These kinds of issues are not specific to aviation.  The nuclear power plant 
industry has had an ongoing debate over much of the last half century about 
probabilistic risk analyses.  A quote from Yellman and Murray (1995 – see also 
Watson, 1994 and 1995) makes the point vigorously and succinctly: 
 “Now consider the statement ‘I estimate the probability of a core-melt in 
this (only partially designed and as yet unbuilt) nuclear power plant over 
ten years of operation to be 0.0000346’.  Not only does the plant not exist, 
it may never be built, or at least not built to the current design.  And if it is 
built,…we won’t get a large and stable enough sample of its operation to 
validate the ’estimate’ to any meaningful degree of confidence.  It sounds 
less abrasive to say that a probability ‘estimate’ is being made than that an 
assertion is being made.” 
Therefore, the message is that ASAS ‘risk estimates’ are actually assertions 
about the degree of risk.  There is no way of demonstrating by logical or 
statistical means that the TLS ‘standard’ would be met – the best evidence that 
can put before the RES is a well argued and robust assertion about the ALS. 
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4. SEPARATION MINIMA 
One of the key safety barriers used to protect against mid-air collision is the use 
of separation minima (sometimes referred to as separation standards).  Any 
sensible theory or framework for mid-air collision risk has to provide an 
understanding of the steps required to get from considerations of separation 
minima to estimates of that risk.  Background on separation minima is given in 
Brooker (2002) and FAA/Eurocontrol (2001).  Their role in ATC is open to several 
interpretations (to quote Simpson (1998): “ATC separation criteria is usually an 
area of confused and non-rigorous analysis”).  From a system point of view, 
separation minima are ‘formal rules’.  Originally, these standards were required 
because of inaccuracies in radar and altimetry data, but they are increasingly 
seen as ‘buffers’ to permit effective warnings and controller/pilot actions.  For 
present purposes, they are the minimum distances that controllers should permit 
between aircraft.   
 
For example, in airspace with secondary radar coverage, the controller operates 
with 5 Nm plan (= horizontal) separation and 1000 feet vertical separation; at 
least one of these minima must be being achieved at all times.  In the case of 
vertical separation, the minimum is interpreted as being at least one flight level 
apart.  There are airspace regions that are not covered by ground-based ATC – 
the North Atlantic (NAT) Region is an important example.  The NAT region 
operates using a structured track system with (eg) aircraft on adjacent tracks at 
the same flight level are kept 1° (roughly 60 Nm) apart.  This standard was 
determined by consideration of navigation performance rather than ‘active’ ATC - 
the driving force to reduce separation minima is fuel penalties.  ASAS concepts 
used in the NAT region could help to reduce separation minima further, but this is 
not discussed in the following. 
 
For ASAS in en route airspace, to quote the FAA/Eurocontrol (2001) document 
“…it is supposed that airborne separation will be provided and maintained 
by flight crews applying standardised separation minima.  Therefore, the 
major issue is the establishment of these ‘airborne separation minima’ so 
as to achieve safe flight operations.  Optimistic views are that airborne 
separation minima could be much smaller than ATC radar separation 
minima and could thus allow for capacity increases.  Other views are 
much more reserved and warn that they might be larger than ATC radar 
separation minima, while possibly smaller than procedural separation 
minima…These separation minima will have to be established at the ICAO 
level...” 
There are two extremely good reasons for retaining the existing minima in an 
ASAS system, certainly initially in the RES’s work (aside from the complexities 
involved in trying to make changes, e.g. see the recent work on separation 
minima changes in an ASAS environment (Eurocontrol, 2002b)).  The first is 
elegantly set out by Quine (1987 – see also Simon, 1982), the second by Popper 
(Medawar, 1991).  Quine notes the virtue of constraints as a ‘freedom from 
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decision’: it limits the searches required.  At present, the controller does not have 
to carry out an assessment about the likelihood of a mid-air collision between 
pairs of aircraft: all he or she need do is to ensure that the separation minima are 
not breached.  Thus, a decision about what to do – and hence the possibility of 
some kind of error – is replaced by an effective ‘rule of thumb’ that establishes 
‘protection criteria’ between aircraft (Simpson, 1998).   
 
Popper’s point is that it is wise to retain as many features of the existing system 
in the new system as possible, and try to introduce change step by step, thereby 
minimising the problems and complexities introduced by new interactions in 
human-machine systems: ‘piecemeal social engineering’ is to be preferred to full 
scale re-engineering.  In particular, to change the arrangements for separation 
minima would risk burdening pilots with extra tasks beyond those that ASAS 
would ‘transfer from the controller’. 
 
Another viewpoint, focusing on en route capacity, is that the economic gains from 
ASAS could be very substantial in terms of reductions in ground-based 
operational costs and the potential for increased capacity (see, for example, 
Brooker, 2002a and 2003).  These would far exceed any from improved 
flightpaths arising from presumably marginal changes to the separation minima.  
So why ‘tinker’ with the latter and hence put in jeopardy the early introduction of 
ASAS?  Strategic financial decisions about ATM system-level investments are 
inherently difficult ones, because the operational adaptive skills of ATC and 
airlines tend to reduce or defer new technology benefits, while few major 
changes produce immediate operational cost savings and revenues to airlines 
and airports (see Brooker, 2002c).   
 
These are different, perhaps somewhat abstract, ways of viewing the issue, but 
the practical safety benefits of retaining separation minima can perhaps be 
simply illustrated from a probabilistic viewpoint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion 
of time  
at this 
separation 
distance 
Separation distance 
Minimum 
No separation 
minimum 
With separation 
minimum 
# 
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Figure 1. Effect of separation minimum of distance distributions – speculative 
 
Figure 1 speculates – note the word – on how the use of a separation minimum 
changes the proportion of time potentially spent at close distances.  The dotted 
line is the case without a minimum, with ATC intervening only when controllers 
judge it is ‘necessary’ to prevent a potential serious conflict.  Controllers would 
probably work with some minimum miss distance in mind.  The closest 
separations would occur when they misjudged relative velocities or when there 
was insufficient time to instruct pilots to manoeuvre.  There would be quite a few 
moderately low separation values (at #) – circumstances where the aircraft were 
close in position but in which the configuration, given relative velocities, would 
not be judged hazardous.  These could not be allowed if a separation minimum 
were in operation.  The dashed line shows the distribution of distances between 
aircraft when using a minimum.  The effect of the minimum is to move the aircraft 
pairs at ‘near to zero’ separation to ‘greater than or near to the minimum’.  Thus, 
the key point is that risk calculations now focus on deviations from a safe value 
rather than the closeness to an unsafe one.  This offers an extra probabilistic 
layer of safety.  Such a role for separation minima has probably been recognised 
in the past, but its importance has not received much attention.   
5. PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
There is a huge literature on Probabilistic Risk Assessment – PRA (Probabilistic 
Safety Analysis – PSA – is also used).  PRAs try to estimate the risk of accidents 
by analysing the sequences of events that could produce an accident – the 
‘causal chains’.  Failures arise from ‘errors’ – or indeed natural variations – from 
‘normal operations’.  At each stage, the probability of an event’s success or 
failure in safety terms has to be quantified.  For events representing the function 
of mechanical or electronic components the failure probability can in theory, and 
often in practice, be determined by observations of the performance of that 
particular sub-system.  An understanding of failure modes and engineering 
characteristics leads to a valid PRA estimate.  But complex systems generally 
contain people who have make decisions and act on the information presented to 
them, so some of the events require probabilities to be estimated for ‘human 
components’ – the task of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). 
 
While these kinds of probability might well be calculated to a good degree of 
approximation for an industrial process, it is much more difficult to produce 
estimates of these risk components for what are already rare events.  A 
necessary ingredient is that the mechanisms and factors involved should be 
traceable to what happens in the real world.  The models may well be 
appropriate but the difficulty is in ‘populating’ them with relevant data.  An 
example is Foot (1994), a trial PSA of the present (sic) UK CAA en route air 
traffic operations. This study illustrates how classical hazard analysis techniques 
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might be applied to subsystems of a complex, man-in-the-loop system to obtain 
the collision risk.  It also demonstrates the combinatorial explosion in fault tree 
complexity and hence the requirement to estimate a raft of failure mode 
parameters.   
 
The traditional way of getting around the problem of the inherent uncertainty in 
probabilistic risk assessment is to aim for a cautious assessment.  If it is possible 
to show that safety targets would be met, even when ignoring significant safety 
barriers (such as TCAS – of which more later) and overestimating failure rates, 
then the problem goes away.  Unfortunately, this seldom works even with current 
ATM systems: a collection of ‘cautious’ assumptions generally tends to produce 
over-pessimistic risk estimates, and hence has little value for safety decision-
makers. 
 
These difficulties with HRA methods, particularly in the nuclear power plant case, 
have themselves generated a huge literature.  Much of the impetus for a very 
critical approach to the subject came from a special edition of ‘Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety’ in 1990.  The editorial by Dougherty and the 
papers by Swain and Moray are good examples of the honest – and indeed wise 
– analysis of the issues.  Hollnagel’s book (1993) and the more recent NATO 
conference (2001) are two instances of the continuing debate on the topic. 
 
Dougherty set out the problems with HRA simply: 
Insufficient empirical data 
Concerns about use of expert judgements, particularly for rare events 
Lack of confidence that simulator data matches real life 
Disconnects between modelling assumptions and psychological 
knowledge 
Use of ‘Performance Shaping factors’ to modify data 
Indeed, some behavioural scientists tend to believe that a much deeper 
theoretical foundation is needed before quantification should be attempted.  This 
is a perfectly valid view, but not very helpful to system designers – how long do 
they (and society) have to wait before the imprimatur of the researchers?  
Hollnagel (1993) does not discuss safety targets, but comments, re improved 
technology to improve ATC capacity: 
…all these enabling technologies could have been developed and used to 
reduce the level of risk while keeping system utilisation constant.  In other 
words, although flights would not have become more frequent, it would 
have become safer to fly.” 
Again, this is a position that can be rationally held, given appropriate premises, 
but is it fruitful for airlines and ATM system designers?  The public actually wants 
better safety and more flights– the TLS has been progressively reduced over the 
last 30 years.   
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But HRA’s issues and lessons cannot be ignored.  Some quotes from Moray 
(1990) are very relevant to the ASAS case: 
“The use of ‘expert judgement’ is a polite name for ‘expert guesses’, and 
we do not have data to validate the accuracy of the guesses. 
The attempt to find a single number is an attempt to establish a context-
free universal fact about human performance.  No such thing exists.  It is 
simply fantasy to think that the probability of human error is described by a 
single number… 
[Re flight crew error rates]  How do any of us survive?  The answer (and 
the lesson) is that in the case of airliners they are quite forgiving 
systems…there is time enough, usually, to make errors, discover them, 
and recover from them. 
The most serious design deficiency of the Chernobyl reactor was 
that…the instability was such that once it occurred there was no time to 
recover from the error.” 
 
A PSA incorporating a HRA is thus a complex – and ultimately probably correct 
model – that is likely only to produce usable answers at some indefinite point in 
the future.  This cannot be the way forward in the present circumstances, and 
‘giving up’ is surely not the conclusion that should be drawn.  There is obviously 
a great deal of valuable information derived from Human Factor experiments.  
How can this best be used and developed?  Can a simpler model framework be 
constructed that delivers testable results?   
 
The danger is therefore the creation of ‘over-elaborate’ models – ones whose 
parameters cannot be reliably estimated from the data likely to be obtainable.  
Thus, the focus has to be on the simplest model that can be soundly based on 
available data.  Section 8 presents a possible model, but it is first necessary to 
explore some human factors-related aspects of Airproxes and ASAS. 
6. ‘REASONABLE INTENT’ RISKS 
Brooker (2002) discusses the lessons that can be learned about potential 
collisions by studying Airproxes; these lessons from Airproxes and other safety 
incidents are not sufficient to prevent all future types of accident – but they do 
offer some necessary tests.  The UK Airprox Board (UKAB) Report data for the 
year 2000 revealed: 
(a) No incidents arose because of a radar accuracy or resolution problem, or 
from normal altimetry operation.  This is not to say that these do not exist, 
but, on the statistical evidence here, they would be a causal factor in only 
a small proportion of Airproxes.  Scans of earlier years’ Airprox reports 
reveal a similar picture. 
(b) In no case did pilots or controllers express strong concerns about 
disruption by warning systems. 
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(c) Most of the Airproxes were judged by the UKAB to have been caused by 
failures in procedures, rules, structures, or communication by both pilots 
and controllers, e.g. ‘pilot misunderstood the ATC instruction’; ‘ATC and 
pilot procedure errors’; ‘controller distraction when sector split’; ‘pilots’ 
poor RT discipline’; ‘pilot procedure for altimetry in error’; ‘ATC memory 
slip’. 
(d) Past UKAB Reports list as the top four causal factors: ‘did not 
separate/poor judgement by controllers’, level busts, ‘did not pass/late 
passing traffic information’, poor coordination by controllers.  These 
immediate causes in this UKAB categorisation would all seem to have 
been human errors of some kind. 
 
Brooker (2002) then introduces two concepts relevant to mid-air collision: 
‘Position Integrity’ and ‘Reasonable Intent’: 
Position Integrity:  The system has this when positional equipment for 
navigation and surveillance is functioning ‘normally’ – when the errors on 
radar, GPS, altimetry, measurements are not extreme, when displays 
work properly, when signals are not corrupted or lost, etc. 
Reasonable Intent:  this is an inference that would usually be made ‘after 
the event’: did the controller implement what a competent controller would 
have considered a reasonable (albeit perhaps not perfect) course of 
action; did the pilot do something that other pilots would have judged 
decent practice (albeit perhaps not the ideal decisions)?  It thus covers 
misjudgements and blunders as normally understood.  It is primarily a 
human factors issue. 
 
In risk budgeting terms (i.e. to compare with the TLS), if Airproxes are a good 
guide to potential mid-airs, risks from Position Integrity failure are the kinds of 
event resulting from the loss of planned separation for which ‘traditional’ (See 
FAA/Eurocontrol, 1998 for a historical review) collision risk models were 
developed.  These models largely focused on equipment performance or failure, 
which would be ‘attributable to the loss of correctly established separation’.  In 
practice, these collision risk models had to be adapted to incorporate reasonable 
intent errors.  For example, even 20+ years ago, the NAT model North Atlantic 
had to include waypoint insertion errors as well as navigation errors (Brooker and 
White, 1979). 
 
Reasonable Intent failures are more typical of observed Airproxes, generated by 
human error in the widest sense.  In crude terms, the first is ‘wrong place on right 
flight path’ and the second is ‘right place on wrong flight path’.  [These types of 
events are both ‘first order’, in that they reflect what are essentially single 
failures, but there can also be multiple problems and specific emergencies – see 
Brooker (2002) - well covered by safety regulation – as evidenced in Profit 
(1995), and are therefore not discussed further here.] 
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The observed relative proportions of different types of Airprox suggest that, for 
the current system, comparatively large proportions of the Air Traffic Services 
risk budget should be allocated to Reasonable Intent risk.  The key argument 
here is that mid-air collision in an ASAS environment will predominantly arise 
from the latter type of risk. 
 
These types of risk cannot be calculated by a similar means to the Position 
Integrity risks.  With these ‘equipment’ risks, it is possible to analyse relevant 
data of what are essentially engineering observations.  By their very nature, 
Reasonable Intent risks are deeply embedded in human functions and 
performance – the subject of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA).  The problems of 
HRA’s application to ATM therefore need to be solved.  This might well be a 
formidable undertaking: controllers’ tasks appear to be much less structured – 
i.e. with more discretion to determine solutions – than are nuclear workers’.   
 
The extent to which the risk in an ASAS environment would reflect the current 
situation – where reasonable intent failures dominate – depends of course very 
much on how the ASAS system is designed and what is the precise role of the 
human.  At one extreme, in particular in an ‘electronic Visual Flight Rules’ 
environment, it is likely that human errors would be the dominant concern.  
However, if the ASAS equipment offered solutions to conflicts, or even executed 
some types of these solutions automatically, then the equipment performance 
would obviously be a much more important factor.  The Airproxes examined 
occurred in a human centred operation, where equipment provides information 
for decision-making but seldom offers solutions and never ‘makes the decisions’; 
hence it is hardly surprising that human errors were leading causal factors. 
7. ASAS SAFETY ISSUES 
Why should one believe that an ASAS operational concept could be constructed 
that would at least maintain and preferably increase safety?  The following 
derived from FAA/Eurocontrol (2001) notes some key safety points: 
Situational Awareness: The flight crew is presented with flight information 
concerning surrounding traffic, possibly in conjunction with a navigation 
display or a surface map, which assists flight crews with: 
? see-and-avoid duties;  
? avoiding blunders or errors; and  
? information to facilitate correct decision-making.  
Automation: ASAS uses various sources of position and intent data.  
ASAS generates guidance to the crew for safe and timely resolution of 
conflicts or maintenance of safe separation. 
Guidance presented directly to flight crew: ASAS guidance does not 
depend on ground-to-air communication, hence preventing the common 
hazard of missed or garbled radio communications. 
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But there are potential negative effects on safety.  The controller’s tasks are 
either eliminated or transferred to the pilot.  Could significant features be lost?  
Could there be new types of pilot-induced errors, or increased rates of existing 
errors, perhaps due to increased workload? 
Human Failure Modes 
A great deal of work has been undertaken in recent years by Eurocontrol and 
states to develop tools and methodologies for the analysis of human error in ATM 
incidents focusing particularly on Human Factors in the resolution of incidents.  
Key elements are the identification of the forms of human error that occur as part 
of an incident, and the decomposition of these errors to determine the 
psychological mechanisms behind the error, and hence the reasons why the 
errors occur.  One recent technique is TRACEr (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002): 
TRACEr provides some basic ‘grammar’ for understanding errors.   
 
At a high level, errors fall into a number of categories associated with the task 
that is being performed (e.g. radar monitoring, strip handling, etc).  Each of these 
errors can have a number of underlying causes (e.g. judgement, 
planning/decision-making failure, perception and vigilance failures).  The ultimate 
cause of an error is the psychological mechanism that results in the operator 
making an error.  Such mechanisms include perceptual tunnelling (when the 
operator focuses on one particular situation at the expense of all others) and 
information processing failure (where the operator’s information processing 
system is unable to cope with the type or quantity of information presented).  For 
the purposes of the analysis of human errors in ATM incidents, a taxonomy has 
been developed for task errors (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002), shown in Figure 2 
below.   
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PRESENT ATM SYSTEM 
 
Controller Task Errors 
 
 
Separation 
Controller-pilot communications  
Radar monitoring 
Aircraft observation / recognition  
Co-ordination 
Control room communications 
Aircraft transfer 
Flight progress strip use  
Operational materials checking  
Training, supervision, or examining 
HMI  
Other task  
 
Pilot tasks 
 
Pilot-controller communications 
Aircraft handling 
Visual observation 
Flightdeck co-ordination/communications 
Operational materials checking  
Training, supervision, or examining 
HMI  
Other task  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASAS SYSTEM 
 
Pilot Task Errors? 
 
 
Pilot-controller communications 
Aircraft handling 
Visual observation 
Flightdeck co-ordination/communications 
Operational materials checking  
Training, supervision, or examining 
HMI  
Separation 
Radar monitoring 
Operational materials checking 
Other task  
NEW – ASAS-RELATED 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Task Error Taxonomy 
 
‘Separation Error’ needs explanation.  These are errors associated with 
controllers climbing, descending or turning aircraft into conflict with other traffic 
(compare with ‘Reasonable Intent’ risks above).  ‘Separation Error’ does not 
therefore refer to the outcome of the error, but rather an error in which the 
prescribed separation was not maintained and which was not detected in time to 
prevent the loss of separation. 
 
What extra types of error would be produced in an ASAS environment?  Would 
there be increased rates for existing types?  Could pilot workload be a significant 
issue?  How loosely or tightly coupled should the system be?  Taking a key 
thought from Moray (1990): how ‘forgiving’ would the system be of errors and 
failures?   
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8. A ‘MINIMAL FRAMEWORK’ COLLISION RISK MODEL 
Definition of the Model 
To try to understand how an ASAS safety proof might be developed, it is easiest 
to construct a ‘Minimal Framework’ Collision Risk model.  This probabilistic 
framework establishes logical connections and allows the several distinct 
components of modelling to be examined.  It starts from aspects clearly related to 
breaches of separation and then focuses down to collision risk.  The 
development of the framework makes apparent what are the key Human Factors 
experiments that need to be performed, i.e. it powerfully links in these 
experiments to risk estimation.  First, it is necessary to define some terms, which 
are then analysed.   
 
A ‘Significant Separation Breach’ – SSB - is an event when two aircraft have lost 
separation in all dimensions by a significant amount and action may be required 
to recover minimum separation.  ‘Significant’ means that small deviations from 
minimum separation, e.g. because of wind effects or FMS smoothing, are 
tolerated: for the moment.  However, ‘significant’ does imply that the breach is 
unacceptable – but not necessarily ‘unsafe’ or ‘hazardous’.  If the present system 
is any guide, SSBs will very probably occur through blunders and other kinds of 
Reasonable Intent failure rather than Position Integrity problems (although it will 
still be necessary to estimate the risks from the latter type of failure – e.g. 
Brooker (2004a/b) discusses analytical calculations of collision risks arising 
solely from radar inaccuracy).  These ‘proximate’ incidents are prima facie 
instances of some degree of need for action to resolve possible problems – 
potential ‘precursor’ events.  Simpson (1998) offers some interesting examples of 
potential encounter criteria akin to an SSB.  As defined, an SSB would roughly 
correspond to Simpson’s ‘Monitoring Criteria’.  An SSB might also be compared 
to an Airprox (see Brooker, 2002 for references and discussion).  The Significant 
Separation Breach Rate – ‘SSBR’ – is the frequency of SSBs per number of 
system flying hours. 
 
The next definition is the SSB/Collision Scaling Factor – SF for short.  It is the 
ratio of the long-term average of collisions to SSBs if no safety defensive barriers 
were in place, i.e. ‘blind flying’.  It reflects the fact that an SSB has much larger 
dimensions than an aircraft, and so the SF is much less than unity. 
 
The third definition tries to summarise detections and actions in the ‘defensive 
barrier’ process: the ‘Barrier Failure Probability’ – BFP.  Two families of 
probabilities need to be estimated: P(T), the probability of detection by time T 
before closest approach – through ASAS, TCAS and visual acquisition – and 
Q(T), the probability of effective conflict resolution given an alert at time T. 
 
With these definitions of terms, the rate of collision CR is: 
CR = SSBR x SF x BFP, ie 
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CR = SSBR x SF x { P(T) # ( 1 – Q(T) ) } 
Here the hash sign and curly brackets represent the convolution integral of the 
functions P(T) and ( 1 – Q(T) ), i.e. the probability densities are multiplied and the 
summed.  The picture is a simple one – Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. ‘Minimal Framework’ collision risk model illustration 
 
This model does need some refinement before it is a full description.  For 
example, there is a possibility that an ‘unnecessary’ evasive manoeuvre – i.e. 
where the aircraft would not have collided if they had kept to their previous 
flightpaths, could result in a collision.  This is probably relatively unlikely, but 
would need to be handled through a separate analysis.  Relevant research has 
been carried out by Geisinger in the context of the Analytic Blunder Model 
(referenced in FAA/Eurocontrol, 1998).  Also relevant is the work done to 
estimate the rate of ‘induced collisions’ that occur through the use of TCAS 
(Harrison, 1993), which showed that in ideal circumstances these could be 
expected at a rate of 4% of the existing (sic – i.e. before TCAS) risk of collision. 
Estimating the Minimal Framework Model parameters 
Significant Separation Breach Rate – SSBR 
The en route horizontal and vertical separation minima are taken as 5 Nm and 
1000 feet respectively.  These tend to the values used by ATC providers with 
(eg) monopulse secondary radars.  For an SSB to be defined, there needs to be 
some judgement about what constitutes a ‘significant’ breach of these minima.  
As noted above, Simpson (1998) has examined this kind of issue with some 
 
SSB Rate 
Scale down for 
‘dimensional probability’ 
Scale down for ‘safety 
defensive barriers’ 
Collision Rate 
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rigour.  For present purposes, the assumption is made that a horizontal breach of 
1 Nm and a vertical breach of 300 feet would count as ‘significant’.  These figures 
are ‘not unreasonable’ given the levels of navigational performance currently 
being achieved. 
 
How would the SSBR be estimated?  As already noted, SSBs very probably will 
not occur through Position Integrity problems but from failures of Reasonable 
Intent – from the consequences of human error modes of the types discussed 
above in relation to TRACEr.  The Sherali et al (2000) and Barnett (2002) 
modelling work are starting points.  They focus on the rate at which conflict 
probes will be required to help resolve potential conflicts.  The next stage used to 
use a technique such as TRACEr (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002) to help to 
generate realistic and comprehensive SSBs at reasonable rates.  TRACEr 
provides some basic ‘grammar’ for understanding errors but further modelling 
work is required.  These are easy to write but the research tasks are probably 
very much harder to do in practice – but it has to be done. 
 
Unfortunately, Airprox data is unlikely to be an adequate guide for SSBs.  The 
present ATC processes generate Airproxes from what is largely a fixed route 
system plus tactical procedures, e.g. with pilot/controller negotiated climbs and 
descents.  ASAS airspace and procedures would be very different. 
 
The range of airspaces used in this modelling would need to cover the full range 
of types of future airspace volumes and traffic densities/patterns.  Given that 
traffic is expected to increase considerably, ASAS would need to be able to 
demonstrate it can cope with high frequencies of potential conflicts in highly 
dense airspace.  It would be essential to include factors that require significant 
‘non-direct’ routeing.  An example is a military zone, either permanent or 
temporary, which in some States these can occupy sizable airspace volumes).  
Weather-related restrictions on particular routes and locations would also be 
‘natural features’ in worldwide ASAS airspace.   
 
The TLS is derived for flights using a large volume of en route airspace.  The 
risks in particular parts of that airspace can be different from this ‘average figure’ 
– see Brooker and Ingham (1977).  However, large deviations from the average 
TLS would not be tolerated.  In ASAS safety calculations, the risks in the different 
types of airspace – in the broadest sense – would therefore need to be properly 
weighted by their system flying hours.  It cannot be assumed that SSBs would 
always occur ‘randomly’ throughout the airspace concerned.  For example, SSBs 
might be more likely near a particular boundary point in ASAS airspace, perhaps 
where aircraft would be ‘funnelled’ into traditional airspace.  This could generate 
incidents where aircraft were cleared to already occupied flight levels, i.e. the 
aircraft would level off at the worst possible location in risk terms (but this higher 
risk would tend to occur for a comparatively small proportion of flying hours). 
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SSB/Collision Scaling Factor - SF 
SF is defined as the ratio of the long-term average of collisions to SSBs if no 
safety defensive barriers were in place, i.e. ‘blind flying’.  It reflects the much 
larger dimensions of an SSB compared to an aircraft.   
 
Suppose aircraft SSB dimensions are modelled as discs (see Brooker (2002 for 
more detail on this model and references to the earlier original work by May and 
others).  Each SSB disc has height Hb and radius Rb as shown below.   
 
Figure 4. SSB disc 
 
Aircraft are taken as having an SSB if their discs touch.  Next, assume that discs 
are always orientated along the relative velocity vector Vr (magnitude Vr) of the 
two aircraft – given that aircraft generally do not change altitude at extremely 
high rates of climb.  [In many collision risk models, these discs are orientated in 
the normal ‘xyz’ coordinates, but this is just a convention.  The discs are not ‘real’ 
– they just serve to ‘envelop’ the aircraft – so their orientation in the model is a 
matter of choice.  The choice made here is convenient and has no physical or 
safety significance, i.e. it does not influence the validity of the results.]  Now, 
model an SSB by an equivalent picture – taking aircraft 2 as a point and the 
‘protected zone’ of aircraft 1 as a larger ‘collision disc’ of dimensions 2Hb and 
2Rb, in the frame of reference based on aircraft 2, i.e. in which it is at rest, as 
illustrated below   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Equivalent collision disc 
 
The ‘cross section’ of the larger collision disc viewed from Aircraft 1 is simply a 
rectangle of area proportional to Hb x Rb.  If the positions and velocities of aircraft 
in an SSB are statistically random, then the calculation of SF is one of 
geometrical probability.  The dimensional dependence for collisions/SSBs would 
2Rb
Hb 
Vr 
Aircraft 1 
Aircraft 2 
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be in proportion to H x R, where H is the height of an aircraft and R the radius of 
a collision disc just enclosing its fuselage and wingspan (Brooker, 2002 and May, 
1971). 
 
Taking the SSB dimensions as:  
Hb = 700 feet = 0.115 Nm 
Rb = 4 Nm 
and the aircraft disc as: 
H = 0.010 Nm = about 60 feet 
R = 0.017 Nm = about 100 feet 
gives: 
SF = ( H x R ) / (Hb x Rb ) 
= 0.010 x 0.017 / 4 x 0.115 = 1 / 2,705 
But this very small number is not a realistic estimate, in particular because of the 
high accuracy of height keeping.   
 
Currently, thanks to improvements in altimetry, aircraft in cruise tend to fly very 
close to their flight levels (see Brooker (2002) and Moek et al (1993) and use 
only a few of them (see Brooker (2002), quoting Moek et al, 1993).  Most modern 
jets are optimised to fly at around the tropopause, say 35,000 feet, so FL 350 
and the immediate neighbouring flight levels are very popular.  The data from 
Moek et al (1993) on vertical errors is: for long/medium range types, the standard 
deviation was 85 feet; for medium/short range types it was 155 feet.  Since 1993, 
there have been continued strenuous efforts by airlines and ATC providers to 
improve and monitor vertical performance, as part of the programme of work to 
reduce vertical separation above FL 290 to 1000 feet.   
 
However, in a free flight ASAS scenario using existing separation minima (e.g. 
see Hoekstra et al, 2002), acceptable flightpaths for aircraft on crossing routeings 
would be separated by one or more flight levels.  This vertical concentration 
means that the likelihood of the aircraft being in ‘vertical overlap’ would be much 
the same for both SSBs and collisions, i.e. there would be much less 
‘dimensional scaling down’.  A simplified calculation of ‘vertical overlap for aircraft 
flying at the same level shows the importance of the effect and the nature of the 
functional dependence.   
 
Denote the aircraft height by H and the probability distribution of heights about 
the flight level by f(v).  For a second aircraft at a distance Y from the flight level 
the probability of the two aircraft being in vertical overlap is: 
∫ +− HY HY dvvf )(  
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If this is summed over all possible Y values, this gives the probability of vertical 
overlap as: 
Pz(0) = ∫ ∞∞− )(Yf ∫ +− HY HY dYdvvf )(  
The zero in the function is just a reminder that the aircraft are intended to be at 
the same altitude z.  It can be assumed that f is a well-behaved function that can 
be expanded out in a Taylor series, to give: 
Pz(0) = dYtermscubicHYfYf }2).({)(∫ ∞∞− +  
The quadratic terms cancel out in the expansion.  If the cubic terms can be 
neglected this becomes: 
Pz(0) ≅  2H dYYf∫ ∞∞− 2)]([  
The integrand’s dependence on [ f(Y)] 2 is important.  As an illustration, taking 
f(Y) as double exponential (not too far from Moek et al’s observed height keeping 
data) gives: 
[ ] 1/ 2.)( −−= λλYeYf              [NB: The standard deviation of f(Y) is √2λ .] 
This gives: 
Pz(0) = H / 2λ  
Thus, an aircraft disc of height 60 feet and a λ  value of 60 feet would give a 
Pz(0) of 0.5.  In practice, f(Y) could be estimated in the same ways used in earlier 
studies (eg, Moek et al, 1993), so the integrals could be computed numerically – 
and might well show that the cubic terms above should not be neglected.   
 
In the horizontal dimension, the ratio of Rb to R would be 4 to 0.017, i.e. 235.  
Multiplying this by 2, i.e. assuming independence between vertical and horizontal 
probability distributions, gives SF as about 1 in 470. 
 
Note the need for ‘randomness’ in this calculation.  It is possible to think of ways 
in which the relative velocity vector might not be uniformly distributed in the Rb 
dimension, e.g. with the funnelling effect noted earlier.   
 
Barrier Failure Probability’ 
The previous elements in the calculation presented – ‘blind flying’ in the fullest 
sense – do not include the safety defensive barrier effects of automatic warning 
systems and controller/pilot action, including the effectiveness of See-and-Avoid.  
BFP measures the effectiveness – or rather the possibility of failure – of these 
barriers.  The present system has three main safety barriers: 
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Conflict Alert (STCA) – The ground computer processing system has the 
facility for analysing SSR tracks to predict if aircraft might come into close 
proximity in the near future and, if they do, warn the controller by flashing 
a message on his radar screen.  Subsequent controller instructions would 
be ‘normal’, e.g. would generally tend to separate the aircraft by horizontal 
vectoring. 
Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System TCAS (generically ACAS II) 
[The abbreviation TCAS will be used here, except in quoted text, to 
emphasize the difference between ASAS and TCAS] – An on board 
collision avoidance system based on detection of other aircraft in the 
vicinity carrying SSR transponders.  These tell the pilot of nearby traffic – 
TA (Traffic Advisory) – and aircraft coming into conflict – RA (Resolution 
Advisory).  RAs tell the pilot to climb or descend as appropriate to take it 
out of risk with immediate action. 
‘See-and Avoid’ – The pilot visually searches for other aircraft, and then 
changes course if this is necessary to avoid them.  Aircraft crew are 
exhorted to maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid potential mid-air 
collisions. 
Other elements also contribute to safety of course, such as the `party line' effect 
in voice communications and the crew's experience about what generally 
happens at particular locations and routeings.   
 
With Full Delegation, ASAS takes over the role of STCA.  ASAS is used to 
ensure that the separation minima between aircraft is maintained; TCAS provides 
a final independent backup system if the separation minima are breached and 
there is risk of collision.  See-and-avoid would be the ‘last resort’ safety tool.  
ASAS conflict detection would operate 10 to 20 minutes before the closest point 
of approach (CPA), while TCAS provides traffic advisories 20 to 50 seconds 
before CPA and Resolution Alert (RA) gives warnings 35 seconds before CPA 
(Eurocontrol, 2002a).  ASAS would need to be integrated – both in terms of 
equipment and in operational usage – with an aircraft’s TCAS (e.g. see Abeloos 
et al (2000), Zeitlin and Bonnemaison (2000), and Zeitlin (2001), and later text in 
this section regarding independence and common mode failures).   
 
Should the effects of al these three be taken into in the risk calculations to 
estimate an ALS to be compared with the TLS?  These are examined in reverse 
order. 
 
A major study on See-and-Avoid (BASI, 1991) concluded that in visual 
conditions, in the absence of some form of traffic alert, the probability of a pilot 
visually acquiring a threat aircraft is generally low until a short time before CPA.  
For commercial aircraft speeds, See-and-Avoid usually failed to alert potential 
collisions.  Even under the best conditions, visual search can be like ‘looking for 
a needle in a haystack’, and in poor visibility the chance of it succeeding would 
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be negligible.  Thus, the pilot cannot reliably visually acquire other traffic or 
consistently.  Trials under test flight conditions suggest that visual acquisition 
alone (i.e. without any ‘cues’ from an alerting system), is less than 50% effective 
(Moore, 1998). 
 
Hence, See-and-Avoid, whilst it plays a useful role, does not reduce risk by a 
quantitatively significant amount.  Moreover, for aircraft flying under IFR, it seems 
rather dubious to be reliant on non-instrument means for any part of the 
protection against catastrophic system failures – which a mid-air collision would 
certainly represent.  Thus, there is not a strong argument for risk reduction from 
See-and-Avoid being estimated in the ALS. 
 
TCAS is rather different – but there are some differing views about its ‘safety 
system function’ (FAA/Eurocontrol 2001).  TCAS was introduced in order to 
reduce the risk of mid-air collisions; and has been designed to operate in all 
airspace.  Thus – paragraph 2.2.6 – it presently ‘serves as a last resort safety 
net, irrespective of any separation standards’ appropriate to airspace categories, 
and ’it has no other role in the ATM system’.  FAA/Eurocontrol (2001) notes that 
ICAO documents indicate that:  
The provision of ATC services in a given airspace shall not be based on 
the ACAS equipage of the aircraft; and  
Air traffic control units shall provide the same services to ACAS and non-
ACAS aircraft.   
On this basis, ATC procedures have to be judged safe without considering the 
effect of the TCAS safety net – so TCAS in practice helps to prevent mid-air 
collisions, but gets no ‘credit’ for this in system safety assessment. 
 
FAA/Eurocontrol (2001) comments (paragraph 3.2): 
“Following appropriate clearances and instructions results in separation 
minima being maintained and thus ensuring safety.  Separation minima 
are established such that the risk of collision is at an acceptable level.  
The other processes by which the flight crews avoid collisions also 
contribute to reducing the risk of collision, but they do so in an 
unquantified way…The use of ACAS does not amount to separation 
provision because it provides no guarantee that the risk of collision is 
reduced to an acceptable level.” 
So, on this view: 
“In normal circumstances, when separation (ATC or flight deck) is 
provided, airborne collision avoidance should not be necessary.  
Applications implementing airborne separation should achieve the 
approved Target Level of Safety (TLS) independently from airborne 
collision avoidance.” 
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Although these views can be comprehended, they do not seem very rational 
ones in terms of the development of TLSs and collision risk modelling.  TLSs and 
ALSs are by their very nature statistical statements rather than ‘guarantees’.  To 
reiterate an earlier point, collisions decades ago might have been more likely to 
be caused by equipment and navigation hardware problems, but today’s 
Airproxes and other incident data shows that the highest likelihood for collision 
arises – in crude terms – from being in the ‘right place but on the wrong flight 
path’.  The view that separation minima somehow ‘guarantee safety’ by 
protecting against ‘technical errors’ on the flight path is therefore wrong.  
Separation minima of themselves do not guarantee safety, any more than a road 
speed limit prevents car crashes.  It is actually the control of the ‘failure rate’ 
when minima are breached that delivers the required safety.   
 
As already stressed, collisions are most likely to be caused by human error in the 
largest sense – and these would be very infrequent probabilistic events.  
Separation minima and TCAS alerts are different ways of providing a safety 
barrier against this possibility, and these barriers are, to different degrees, 
statistical in nature rather than providing ‘guarantees’.  One of them reduces the 
complexity of decisions that controllers have to take; the other alerts pilots and 
controllers to the need to take a decision.  Both of them are now integral parts of 
the ATM safety system – so why should only one of them be included in risk 
calculations? 
 
A major problem is that a flawed definition of ‘ATM system’ appears to have been 
adopted by Eurocontrol (e.g. in Eurocontrol SRC (2000a) – ‘ESARR 4’) and 
ICAO.  Surely, the most rational definition would be something on the lines of:  
ATM system: Everything that contributes to the safe movement of air 
traffic – the ‘Total System’. 
The prime goal of the ATM system on this definition is to control risks.  Safety in 
ATM is ‘the interaction between Procedures, People and Equipment’ 
(Baumgartner, 2003).  The pilot is part of this ATM system.  In the current 
system, the controller generally has greater knowledge of the ATM environment 
and the risks posed by neighbouring aircraft than does the pilot.  But Total 
System safety depends on the pilot’s actions, which include following instructions 
from the controller and that the pilot acts in accord with TCAS alerts. 
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Moreover, and essentially continuing the discussion in Section 3, the TLS was 
never intended to be a measure of ‘acceptable air traffic control failure’ but to be 
a target that the ATM system should achieve.  The TLS was not developed on 
the basis that certain types of system, technology or procedure would either be 
present or absent.  The risk calculations for an ATM system’s ALS were seen as 
potentially including all mitigating factors, from controller monitoring and 
intervention to automatic warning systems.  The TLS was not therefore produced 
in the context of the causal factors or mechanisms by which safety is either at 
risk from or by which it is assured.  The ICAO teams that developed the TLS 
philosophy did not a priori rule out the use of systems such as TCAS in delivering 
the TLS (Brooker and Ingham (1977) sets out the key references).  In the modern 
day, the point is well illustrated by Baumgartner’s (2003) definition: “TLS: The 
level of safety which the total system is designed to meet”.   
 
These comments can only scratch the surface of the issues involved in setting 
the right future policy for the inclusion – or otherwise – of TCAS in hazard 
analyses.  Further papers will endeavour to achieve a fuller analysis, with 
detailed critiques of present ICAO and Eurocontrol policy, including ESARR 4 
(Eurocontrol SRC, 2000a). 
 
Returning to the calculation of Barrier Failure Probability: the  two generic terms 
P(T) and 1 – Q(T) in BFP, the first is, leaving aside See-and-Avoid elements, 
equipment-based, while the second depends on human performance given an 
alert.  In both cases, these probabilities are averaged over the range of 
encounters.  It needs to be stressed that all the parameters in the Minimal 
Framework Model are long-term averages for the airspaces under consideration 
– remembering that the TLS is itself a long-term average rate for mid-air collision 
accidents. 
 
Estimates of P(T) can be made by simulating the operation of ASAS and TCAS 
on representative aircraft encounters.  In the past, before these types of 
equipment were in common use, this could be done by using radar encounter 
data.  A good example using UK data is the study by Hale and Law (1989).  This 
was very important work because it showed inter alia that all genuinely ‘serious’ 
encounters, out of a sample of more than a thousand aircraft pairs, were 
detected by both systems.  Its key conclusion was that ‘the majority of conflicts 
likely to result in a TCAS RA would have been already alerted to the controller in 
good time to anticipate the RA’. 
 
For the full delegation scenario, ASAS would have to be demonstrated to deliver 
at least equal performance to STCA, because it has to provide equivalent 
functionality.  There are important issues here about the extent that ASAS and 
TCAS equipments use the same information sources and how they are 
integrated in aircraft systems.  Abeloos et al (2000) suggest that surveillance 
data fusion of ADS-B and TCAS could improve airborne surveillance 
performance; and recommend that ASAS and TCAS data be presented on the 
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same display.  Zeitlin and Bonnemaison (2000) note the importance of 
TCAS/ASAS independence, and in particular stress that any loss of ASAS 
functions must not be detrimental to the functioning of TCAS, given its 
‘independent last resort’ requirement.  Hence, it is vital to understand the risks 
posed by ‘common mode’ failures and how they might be mitigated. 
 
Estimates of 1 – Q(T) require simulation by aircrew, across the whole range of 
categories of encounter examined for P(T).  Simulations of probability of 
detection for ‘seeded errors’ are necessary to test out the resilience of the 
system.  The aim is to build confidence in the adaptability of the system rather 
than produce any kind of statistical proof.  Resilience in this context is the 
number of safety barriers that are operative, but also has to provide assurance 
that system safety reaction times are sufficient.  These seeded errors in 
simulation have to match the types of things that can happen, i.e. as generated 
by the error processes that lead to significant safety breaches.  A further check 
would be to verify that all existing types of Airproxes are resolved.   
 
How can it be known that the results of such simulations are ‘right’, or rather that 
they can deliver the kinds of statistical statements that are required?  As noted in 
an earlier Section, the contributors to the special edition of ‘Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety’ in 1990 raised several wise concerns about 
simulation and the need for validation.   
 
Some simple comments need making here.  To start with, it is a question of 
confidence in results.  Simulation can be an effective tool, but the trials must take 
place over comparatively long periods to eliminate unfamiliarity with new 
processes.  Fortunately, ASAS as envisaged here requires aircraft/pilot 
simulation rather than workstation/controller simulations.  Aircraft simulators can 
now be very realistic, as evidenced by the realistic behaviour of pilots in 
emergency scenarios.  But the estimation of the BFP must also guard against 
aircrew being too aware that some kind of abnormal incident has been 
programmed.  Thus, it is vital to test seeded ‘blunders’ in the context of a 
reasonably long stretch of normal operations rather than just present the aircrew 
with a high rate of blunders.  
9. CONCLUSIONS 
With Full Delegation Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS), separation 
control would be delegated to the (properly equipped) aircraft, i.e. aircraft pilots 
are responsible for their aircraft’s separation from other flights.  The aim is to try 
to identify a tangible work programme – rational and evidence based, and within 
the compass of known techniques – a framework that would prove safety.   
 
Reasons for retaining the existing separation minima in an ASAS system have 
been put forward.  The observed relative proportions of different types of Airprox 
suggest that, for the current system, comparatively large proportions of the Air 
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Traffic Services risk budget should be allocated to ‘Reasonable Intent’ risk 
(effectively ‘right place on wrong flight path’).  The key argument here is that mid-
air collision in an ASAS environment will predominantly arise from this type of 
risk.  Problems with the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment with safety-critical 
events requiring probabilities to be estimated for ‘human components’ – Human 
Reliability Analysis – are reviewed.   
 
The danger is the creation of ‘over-elaborate’ models – ones whose parameters 
cannot be reliably estimated from the data likely to be obtainable.  Thus, the 
focus has to be on the simplest model that can be soundly based on available 
data.  A simple ‘Minimal Framework’ Collision Risk Model is therefore 
constructed – which potentially can deliver practical results.  It has three 
components:  
Significant Separation Breaches (SSB) – events when two aircraft have 
lost separation in all dimensions by a significant amount and action may 
be required to recover minimum separation;  
SSB/Collision Scaling Factor (SF) – the ratio of the long term average of 
collisions to SSBs if no safety defensive barriers were in place; and the  
Barrier Failure Probability (BFP) – the probability of failure of safety 
defensive barriers such as automatic warning systems.  
The analysis here shows that these factors can be modelled by: 
SSBR – airspace geometry/traffic pattern plus human error simulation 
SF – kinematics of encounters 
BFP – equipment and human performance knowledge/simulations 
Many of the building blocks for these already exist.  This structure therefore 
enables these components to be integrated with specific additional work to be 
developed from well-specified experiments.  But the challenge is to develop 
focused simulation tools and structured experiments to deliver quantitative 
outputs – results that are sufficiently convincing for the Rational Evidence 
Scrutiniser of Section 2.  To reiterate the key point in that section’s debate, this 
degree of ‘confidence’ can only come about through the creation of a compelling 
‘narrative’ explanation, soundly based in theoretical understanding and empirical 
evidence, and open to challenge, checking and verification at every stage.   
 
If this approach does not work, then what could? 
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